Book Review: The Judicial Process in Tort Cases by James, Fleming, Jr.
BOOK REVIEWS
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN TORT CASES-by Leon Green.t Second Edition.
The West Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1939. Pp. xxi, 1356. $7.50.
In this second edition of his case book, Dean Green has not altered
the fundamental scheme of the original work.' The principal changes
he has made are these:
1. The omission of former Parts 2 and 3 which comprised over 600
pages of the first edition, and the substitution for them of some forty
pages of explanatory material. These parts were called Interests in
Relations with Others and Interests of Personality, Property, and in
Relations with Others, and included, among other things, wrongful death
and defamation. These topics are now taught in a separate Torts course
in the Northwestern Law School.
2. The shortening of the remaining material by about ten per cent,
and the printing of it in very readable larger type. The book is now
no longer than several other torts case books.
3. The addition (and substitution) of a generous supply of cases
decided since the first edition and a careful revision of footnotes.
4. Some rearrangements of the materials. The most important of
these is to be found in the chapter now called Threats, Insults, Blows,
Attacks, Fights, Restraints, Nervous Shocks.2 The number of section
headings in the chapter has been increased (though some of these are
lumped together for treatment, e.g. § 5 Use of Firearms, § 6 Sports and
Practical Jokes, § 7 Conduct of Children and Insane Persons, and
§ 8 Fright and Nervous Shock). The self-defense cases have been
put in a separate section. The old heading Conduct With Reference
to Women has been discarded and its contents divided: the rape cases
being put under Offensive Physical Contacts and the fright and shock
cases being labelled as such.
The chapter on Keeping of Animals has lost its separate existence to
become a subsection under the treatment of Occupancy of Land. The
tDean of the School of Law, Northwestern University.
'For reviews of the first edition, see Keigwin (1932) 20 GEORGETOWN LAW JoURNAL 549;
Goodhart (1932) 32 COL. L. Rxv. 762; Shulman (1932) 45 HARv. L. R-v. 1445; Polikoff
(1932) 80 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 929; Gifford (1932) 41 YAT.E L. J. 1264.
2Now c. II, p. 5; formerly c. I, p. 1.
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order of three other chapters has been changed3 though the scope of
each remains about the same.
As I have said, the underlying scheme of the first edition, with its
concomitant point of view, is basically unchanged. Dean Green believes
that a more fruitful approach to the subject can be made by grouping
cases on the basis of factual situations than is afforded by conventional
classification according to legal concepts. Legal rules and formulas are
not regarded as unimportant. On the contrary, they "give the power of
language to the student, lawyer, and judge to deal with the transaction
involved in litigation."4 But in most types of cases these rules and prin-
ciples are "numerous and competitive," so, it may be inferred, they do
not determine the outcome of the cases,5 and therefore cannot form a
satisfactory framework for a study of torts (or, I suppose, of anything
else). Few lawyers-whether in or out of law teaching-are actually
unaware that many things besides doctrine influence the decisions of the
law. Some of these other factors may well be-singly or in combination-
more influential in shaping the outcome of a single case or the course of
a legal trend than is the reasoning commonly found in judicial opinions.
This much can be and I think usually is pointed out to law students.
The question is, how much more about these non-legal determinants
and consequences of legal action, can usefully be taught. And that in
turn depends on whether anything roughly approaching systematic knowl-
edge of a cause and effect relationship between legal decisions and any
given set of non-legal factors can be had. Professor Underhill Moore has
attempted a really scientific inquiry into some questions of this kind0
but it would be impossible today to compile a casebook on torts that
came anywhere near to satisfying his standards. On the other hand, it
is fair to expect a radically new arrangement of tort cases to provide at
least a likelihood that it will disclose factors which afford a better basis
for prophecy and understanding of the judicial process than the older
3Viz. former chapters V, VI, and VII are now chapters VIII, VII, and V respectively.
'Preface to first edition reprinted (2d ed.) p. vii. The notion is not unlike that expressed
by Thurman Arnold's phrase "argumentative technique."
'See GREN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930) 19; cf. CORWIN, TWLIGHTr OF THE SUIPREmE CoUmr
.(1934).
'Moore and Hope, An Institutional Approach to the Law of Commercial Banking (1929)
38 YAE L. J. 703; Moore and Sussman, Debiting of Direct Discounts (1931) 40 YALE
L. J. 381, 555, 752, 928, 1055, 1219. But see Fuller, American Legal Realism (1934) 82
U. OF PA. L. REv. 429.
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arrangements did, when supplemented by the amount of horse sense that
every lawyer worth his salt must have.7 Dean Green believes that if we
focus our attention on the type of situation or relationship that gave rise
to the litigation we will find out more about how and why courts react
than we would if we paid relatively more attention to the legal reasoning
found in the opinion. I do not altogether disagree with him. Surely the
growth and development of much of our recent tort law cannot be fully
understood without a knowledge and appreciation of the growth of the
automobile and its use, the extent and incidence of the loss it causes,
the advent of liability insurance and the types of coverage it provides,
the rise of a sentiment in favor of social insurance, and many other
circumstances attending this relatively new social problem. Quite dif-
ferent considerations come into play when a doctor is sued for mal-
practice, and a separate treatment of the two lines of cases may have
more utility than would scattering them with others through successive
developments of the concepts of negligence, vicarious liability, and so on.
The only serious defect I find in Dean Green's presentation of materials
is that it goes too far in one direction and not far enough in another.
It goes too far in abandoning the conventional framework and in relying
upon types of fact situations for its categories. I think this is so for
two reasons: (1) primarily because I, more than does Dean Green, be-
lieve legal concepts, principles and rules play a more important part in
determining the operation of the judicial process. The difference is simply
one of degree in a matter of opinion. Obviously the amount of emphasis
put on the origin, history and development of concepts as such will vary
with the extent of this difference of opinion. (2) Because a complete
set of significant new categories has not been offered, so that the author
has been driven to formulating some that are not significant and to
developing others in a way that suggests only an attempt to fill gaps.
Many examples of both were given by reviewers of the first edition and
most of these have not been remedied. The present heading Freight
Transportation" furnishes an instance. The first case under it deals with
the unpreventable trespass of an ox being driven home from market.
The next three deal with loss, damage, or delay to railroad freight ship-
"It would scarcely be worth while, for instance, to scrap conventional treatment just to
show that juries are occasionally influenced by the personality of counsel and their clients,
or that appellate courts are sometimes impressed by the fact that one lawyer arguing before
them is a man of good reputation, another a known shyster.
'Pp. 1128-1154.
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ments, the fifth is Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Company,9 and
the last is the Polemis case.10
On the other hand it seems to me that Dean Green has not in his
materials exploited to the full some very interesting possibilities sug-
gested by his groupings of cases. These, we have seen, are non-legal.
They could well be enriched and pointed up by use of available non-
legal material. That is notably true of the section on automobile trans-
portation. Important statutory developments in this field have also been
ignored.
Notwithstanding this defect, if it is one, Dean Green's work, because
of its excellent choice of cases, because of its publication of most of the
* cases in full, because of the superior quality of its footnotes, and because
there is much that is provocative of thought in its arrangement, deserves
to be ranked high among casebooks in the field today.
FLEMING JAMES, JR.*
THE LAW OF WILLS-by W. D. Rollison.f Callaghan and Company, Chicago,
1939. Pp. xxi, 827. $6.00.
This book is a restatement for law school students of the law of
descent, of wills, and of the administration of estates of decedents. The
author gives unusual attention to the historical approach, tracing for each
major subdivision of his work, not only the situation at the early com-
mon law and in the ecclesiastical courts, but also the pertinent provi-
sions of the Statute of Wills, the Statute of Frauds, and the Wills Act
in England, with some indication of the most usually found statutes in
this country. This presentation, as an introduction to each subject, aids
materially in comprehending the statutory situation respecting the par-
ticular topic under consideration.
The book is founded frankly on the cases that have been considered
leading cases for some time, many of which can be located in familiar
English and American selective case compilations. The author does not
'109 Minn. 456, 124 N. W. 221 (1910). The damage here was done in a storm by
making a boat secure to plaintiff's dock. The decision awards damages though the de-
fendant concededly did no wrong. The boat was a freighter.
"Polemis and Furness, Witby & Co., Ltd., [19211 3 K. B. 560.
*Professor of Law, Yale University School of Law; Acting Dean, University of Utah
School of Law, 1939-1940.
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